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Much effort goes into building markets as a tool for economic and social development;
those pursuing or promoting market huilding, however, often overlook that in too many
places social exclusion and poverty prevent many, especially women, from participating
in and accessing markets. Building on data from rural Bangladesh and analyzing the work
of a prominent intermediary organization, we uncover institutional voids as the source of
market exclusion and identify two sets of activities—redefining market architecture and
legitimating new actors-^as critical for huilding inclusive markets. We expose voids as
analytical spaces and illustrate how they result from conflict and contradiction among
institutional bits and pieces from local political, community, and religious spheres. Our
findings put forward a perspective on market huilding that highlights the on-the-ground
dynamics and attends to the institutions at play, to their consequences, and to a more
diverse set of inhabitants of institutions.
If someone who has no property rights under the
law, who has had no formal education, who has no
legal right to divorce, who will very likely be beaten
if sbe seeks employment outside the home, says that
she endorses traditions of modesty, purity, and self-
abnegation, it is not clear that we should consider
this the last word on the matter.
-Marta Nussbaum
This article is the outcome of a truly collaborative effort,
and all three authors contributed equally. Although our
work is about breaking conventions, we for once adhere to
conventions in publishing and list authors in alphabetical
order. We would like to tbank Tima Bansal for ber excep-
tional guidance and tbree anon)rmous reviewers who en-
couraged and helped us to find and refine the empirical and
theoretical nuggets in this project. This article would not
have been possible without BRAG and the people that make
BRAG. We particularly thank Fazle Abed for sharing in-
sights and wisdom. We are also grateful for the following
people who graciously shared their concerns and sugges-
tions: Yasser Bhatti, Dana Brown, David Gourpasson, Gré-
goire Groidieu, Frédéric Delmar, Gatherine Dolan, Ingrid
Erickson, Fabrizio Ferraro, Royston Greenwood, Garol
Leonard, Ray Loveridge, John Meyer, Philippe Monin, Mari
Sako, Saras Sarasvathy, Marc Schneiberg, Dick Scott, and
Ghrisüan Seelos. This work also greatly benefited from
discussions at the 2006 Summer Institute "Trajectories of
Capitalism" at the Genter of Advanced Studies in the Be-
havioral Sciences, an economic sociology panel at the 2006
Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association,
the 7th Neo Institutionalism Workshop at EM LYON Busi-
ness School, and the 2011 Strategy and Innovation confer-
ence at the Said Business School.
Researchers and policy makers have long argued
that markets are engines for economic growth and
that market-based activities constitute an importani
tool for social progress, economic empowerment,
and human development (Seelos & Mair, 2007;
Stiglitz, 1989; UNDP, 2008). In this spirit, many
contemporary policy initiatives make poor wom-
en's market access and participation central to their
experiments and pilot programs—an aspect of pol-
icy broadly referred to as "developing inclusive
markets" (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008). Yet these well-
intended interventions often overlook the role that
local institutions such as customs, religious credos,,
and social norms play in compromising the potential
for women's economic activify. One of our fieldwork
informants in Bangladesh said, "How can I go to the
market? I am a woman!" Her words exemplify how
women in too many places are excluded from market-
based activifies and expose how social conventions
prevent them from market access. The simple quote
also points to the limits of promoting the role of
markets without analyzing how local context and
institutional arrangements shape markets and mar-
ket-based activify (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011).
Institutions, metaphorically referred to as the
"rules of the game" (North, 1990), matter for markets;
they enable and support market activify (Campbell &
Lindberg, 1990; De Soto, 2000; Greif, 2006; Sen,
1999). Where such institutions are absent or weak,
management and strategy scholars point to the pres-
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ence of "Institutional voids," realities that can impact
market formation, economic growth, and develop-
ment (Khaima & Palepu, 1997; Webb, Tihanyi, Ire-
land, & Sirmon, 2009). Researchers further note that
absent and weak market institutions reinforce exist-
ing social inequalities as market access and opportu-
nity are governed by local institutional arrangements
(Crow, 2001; Rodrik, 2007). Such local arrangements
consist of complex interlocks of formal institutions,
such as constitutions, laws, properfy rights, and gov-
ernmental regulations, and informal institutions,
such as customs, traditions, and religious beliefs
(Fligstein, 2001; North, 1991), that not only enable
but also constrain market activity. They determine
the rules of the game and, importantly, who is al-
lowed to play.
Local realities are the point of departure for this
study. Otir objective is to clarify market-building
processes by interrogating the concept of institu-
tional voids in institutionally complex contexts—
particularly where markets and market-based activ-
ities are seen as tools for economic development.
Drawing on an in-depth qualitative study, we focus
our empirical efforts on the case of Bangladesh and
the work of BRAC,^  a prominent, pervasive local
intermediary agency. Whereas many studies view
institutional voids as "empty" of specific institu-
tions, our findings suggest that voids occinr amidst
institutional plurality and are the intermediate out-
come of conflict and contradiction among local po-
litical, community, and religious spheres. This
fresh perspective detects institutional voids as an
important driver of market exclusion and provides
an analytical anchor for the study of market-build-
ing processes. Our analysis of the varied work of
BRAC over several decades suggests that market
access and participation are negotiable and market
boundaries are potentially permeable for actors
who have been excluded.
The perspective on market building we put for-
ward highlights "on-the-ground" dynamics and at-
tends to the consequences of market building for
the people involved. Otn: findings complement and
extend research on the institutional formation and
infrastructure of markets by highlighting market
building as inhabited—that is, as replete with peo-
ple and activity, albeit focused to varied purposes.
^ BRAC originally stood for "Bangladesh Rehabilita-
tion Assistance Committee," in line with its focus on
relief work after natural disasters. In 1973, BRAC was
renamed "Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee"
to reflect its focus on development. Almost three decades
later, when BRAC was already working in the country's
urban slums and had started to work internationally, it
became "Building Resources Across Communities."
More specifically, we explain how markets can be-
come inclusive places: legitimated arenas for inter-
dependent social and economic activity where for-
mal possibilities align with practical access across
gender, race, religion, and social class.
MARKET BUILDING AND
INSTTTUTIONAL VOIDS
Markets, Institutions, and Context
Institutionalists throughout the social sciences
agree that markets are systems of economic ex-
change and spaces for social interaction as well as
complex bimdles of institutions (Geertz, 1978; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998;
McMillan, 2002; North, 1990). A context-specific
and often complex assembly of institutions includ-
ing both formal rules and informal norms generates
market microstructures and assembly of institu-
tions that configure sociopolitical contexts and or-
ganize the "terms of action" (Fligstein, 2001). These
institutional architectures vary across polities,
comprising rules for what issues are public and
collective and which actors are authorized to en-
gage these issues (Jepperson & Meyer, 1991). Along
with recognizing such cross-polity variation, schol-
ars warn of the "need to maintain a healthy scepti-
cism toward the idea that a specific type of institu-
tion is the only type that is compatible with a
well-functioning market economy" (Rodrik, 2007:
162-163). This contention signals the need for in-
quiries about market-building processes in institu-
tionally complex contexts (Granovetter & McGuire,
1998; Mair & Marti, 2009; Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000).
Building markets is neither easy nor unproblem-
atic. Regardless of how efficient a particular insti-
tutional arrangement has proven itself in a specific
context, the efficacy and impact of that same insti-
tutional assembly will likely vary in a different
context. Institutional frameworks of meaning and
authority shape the conditions of market building
and the particular tactics that actors use (Biggart &
Guillen, 1999; Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). Recent
work in the economic sociology of markets (Flig-
stein, 2001; Zelizer, 2005), the varieties of capital-
ism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), and institutional eco-
nomics (Greif, 2006; North, 1990; Rodrik, 2007)
points to the varied intertwining of culture and
politics in the social organization of markets and
economies. Despite observing differences in foci
and mechanisms, scholars argue that markets are
constructed rather than "natural" or spontaneous
entities. This scholarship also challenges the dom-
inant, simplified (and simplifying) view of markets
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as cleanly distinguished from the infrastructure of
their local contexts. Careful attention to the rules of
the game in markets points to the relevance of the
context and processes hy which they emerge (Flig-
stein, 2001; Creif, 2006; North, 1990; Rodrik, 2007).
The process of institutionalizing the rules that gov-
ern exchange and market-based activity is ongoing
and observable, and as such it provides a lens for
ohserving market huilding and the activities of di-
verse institutional actors (Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009; Spicer et al., 2000; Stark, 1996).
Institutional Voids
Recent work on institutional voids in strategy and
economics recognizes the central role that insütu-
fions—and their ahsence—play in developing market
economies and in shaping the behavior of a particular
set of actors: firms and entrepreneurs. Standard
claims locate the source of key market institutions
such as properfy rights and autonomy in state action
and rules (Camphell & Lindherg, 1990; La Porta et al.,
1998; North, 1990). Where properly designed and
implemented, these institutions provide the rules of
the game that support formaüon of ideal typical mar-
kets to form. If these institutions are ahsent or weak,
the argument goes, institufional voids occur, and a
compensatory social structure is needed to spur mar-
ket formation and operafion (Creif, 2006; IQiarma &
Palepu, 1997). Building on new institutional econom-
ics and agency theory, Khanna and Palepu (1997,
2000) extended LefPs (1976) work on husiness groups
in developing economies, to contend that large busi-
ness groups imitate and subsfitute for missing insü-
tuüons to ensure market function in the event of
market failures due to the presence of insfitutional
voids (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Kharma &
Rivkin, 2006). In this stream of research, institutional
voids are typically presented as inhihitors of the es-
tahlishment of Western-style markets. The proposed
solutions tj^ically favor the transfer of institutional
technology as a compensatory mechanism over local
experimentation and recombination.
Following Khanna and colleagues, and drawing
from a broader spectrum of research on institutions
(North, 1990; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), recent
scholarship in organizational theory and strategy
has focused on the consequences of institutional
voids on business strategy. Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik,
and Peng (2009) showed that the relative strength
or weakness of various institutional ftameworks
impacts alternative modes of entry in India, Viet-
nam, South Africa, and Egypt. Puffer, McCarthy,
and Boisot (2009) revealed that weak and lacking
formal institutions in Russia and China force entre-
preneurs to rely on trust within networks as well as
on blat and guanxi, respectively (see also Ahlstrom
& Bruton, 2006). Additionally, Chakrabarty (2009)
showed that institutional voids influence family
ownership patterns in 27 countries.
A second set of studies points to the impact that
instituüonal voids have on entrepreneurial processes
in "base of the pyramid" (BOP) markets and local
informal economies. Webb et al. (2009) suggested sev-
eral ways that insfitutional incongruence and weak
enforcement of formal insfitutions facilitate entrepre-
neurial processes in an informal economy. Cross-sec-
tor alliances between commercial companies and lo-
cal social entrepreneurs have been shown to remove
the "hurdles of implemenfing BOP models" (Seelos &
Mair, 2007:49) by reducing the uncertainfy caused by
weak market institufions (Webb, Kistruck, h-eland, &
Ketchen, 2010). Together, these studies reinforce the
importance of understanding the institutional infra-
structure of markets and foreground the impact of
institutional voids on effecüve market functioning
(North, 1990; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009).
They also showcase a productive conversation be-
tween insfitutional economists and strategy research-
ers, one that highlights a shared interpretation of in-
stituüonal voids as spaces empfy of instituüons. This
interpretation stands in contrast to the interpretafion
favored by sociologists and anthropologists, who em-
phasize the abundance and complexify of insfitutions
present in similar contexts and situations and who
focus on the people parficipaüng (and not participat-
ing) in markets (Banfield, 1958; Friedland & Alford,
1991; Ceertz, 1978; Zelizer, 2010). Engaging the eco-
nomic and strategy line of research with the sociolog-
ical and anthropological line of research opens up a
salient debate on the processes involved in building
markets as inclusive arenas for social interaction and
economic exchange. Although previous studies have
elaborated on a varied set of consequences resulting
from the presence of institutional voids, much is
still unknown about how insfitutional voids are con-
stituted, how they relate to existing institutional ar-
rangements, and how they matter for local
populations.
Market Building in and aroimd Institutional Voids
Institutional economists and their colleagues in
finance have developed suhstantial empirical and
theoretical arguments about the institutional infra-
structures and rules that support market formation
and associated economic development (La Porta et
al., 1998; Morrison, 2004; Morrison & White, 2009;
North, 1990). This diverse work finds suhstantial
policy expression in the legacy of North and in the
work of neo-Hirschman scholars (Chan, 2002; Ro-
drik, 2007). The gist of the argument is that specific
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configurations of (micro and macro) institutions
conduce to market formation. In the absence of
these institutional arrangements (i.e., in the pres-
ence of institutional voids), there is much difficulty
in establishing markets and the necessary outcomes
such as transparency and efficiency. Much of the
policy translation of this work, however, reinforces
the imagery that markets come into being in equi-
librium. Moreover, although the attention to the
"putting in place" of markets and market reforms is
important, it neglects the complex work and les-
sons for policy from attending to the early stages
and dynamics of market building.
For this focus on early moments, we have re-
course to economic and cultural sociologists whose
work is reinserting activity into market formation.
At the broader societal level, work on markets as
politics views the institutional architecture of
markets as the outcome of social movement-like
struggles between incumbents and challengers
(Bourdieu, 2005; Fligstein, 2001), highlighting the
struggles among actors to harness the cultrual, po-
litical and institutional resources to organize mar-
kets and economies (Anteby, 2010; Biggart & Guil-
len, 1999; Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). This research
makes explicit the link between social movements,
corporations, the state apparatus, and markets
(Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Schneiberg,
2007; Tilly & Tilly, 1998). Such emerging imagery
of market building draws on an understanding of
institutions as both obdurate and stable but also not
without activity and contest.
A parallel stream of scholarship from the social
sciences prompts yet another useful reading on the
role of institutions and institutional dynamics in
the process of market building. An important line
of work by sociologists shows that markets are of-
ten built with, rather than on, the bit and pieces of
institutions (Stark, 1996). These insights reposition
attention onto the plurality of incumbent institu-
tional arrangements that support economies and
markets (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Ostrom, 1990;
Thelen, 2004). This scholarship also shows how, in
many cases, these incumbent institutional arrange-
ments supplant institutions tbat support Khanna et
al.'s model of the market economy or "market cap-
italism." Moreover, whereas many studies on insti-
tutional voids have, to a large extent, omitted peo-
ple (for an exception see Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, &
Sirmon [2009]) and neglected the disenfranchised,
an emerging body of literature is beginning to focus
on tbe reality of activity present in "inhabited in-
stitutions" (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006: 231). This
nascent trajectory in the field is (re)infusing insti-
tutionalism with a "lost" microsociology (Barley,
2008; Hallett, 2010; Kellogg, 2009), in turn enrich-
ing the context of economic sociology.
We draw on this understanding of institutional
configurations and dynamics to investigate the
sources of institutional voids. We treat voids as
analytical spaces at the interface of several institu-
tional spheres, each with its own animating logic of
meanings and social practices (Friedland & Alford,
1991). This reading departs from the conventional
view that privileges modern/Western interpreta-
tions of key market institutions and emphasizes the
functioning of ideal markets. By accentuating the
situated and intermediate nature of institutional
voids, we develop a view of voids that originates in
the presence of plural, often contending, institu-
tional arrangements (Banfield, 1958; Fourcade,
2007; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kogut et al., 2000;
Sako, 2009; Stark, 1996), rather than continuing the
view of "empty" institutional space. The analytic
point to be made here is that even the ideal typical
market promised by standard market institutions
can reflect broader inequalities in a society and
thus result in exclusionary markets. Our approach
links institutional voids to grounded sources for
limits on market participation and access. This ap-
proach also generates conceptual and empirical
claims about how institutional plurality, conflict,
and contradiction contribute to tbeorizing on inclu-
sive markets and toward tbeir potential implemen-
tation. We also see this as an opportunity to inte-
grate scholarship focused on market consequences
with the standard work on markets and institu-
tional voids. Studies of market consequences vary
in focus, but are especially well developed in terms
of policy issues such as the distributional impacts
of markets (Easterly, 2002; Stiglitz, 2000), cultural
effects on endogenous preferences (Bowles, 1998),
questions of social empowerment and the exclu-
sion from labor markets (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011),
and the emerging work on inclusive markets (Men-
doza & Thelen, 2008).
To summarize, we extend the research on institu-
tions and markets to put forward a perspective on
market building that highlights tbe on-the-ground dy-
namics in complex institutional contexts. To advance
this perspective, we pose two broad questions to
guide our empirical analysis of building inclusive
markets in nural Bangladesh: (1) How do institutional
voids arise in institutionally complex settings, with
what consequences for market access and participa-
tion? (2) What organizational and other activities
work these voids to build inclusive markets? To an-
swer the first question, we focus on two standard
market institutions, property rights and autonomy,
engaging this standard view witb work on plural in-
stitutional spheres. Drawing on this analysis, we ex-
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plore the second question with a detailed case study
of a prominent local intermediary agency in Bangla-
desh and its portfolio of initiatives and activities to
address market inclusion.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS
Research Setting
To probe the concept of institutional voids and to
examine market building processes in an institution-
ally complex context, we focus on the case of BRAC
(Mair & Marti, 2009; Sachs, 2005; Smillie, 2009). Ban-
gladesh is a complex country setting in which to
analyze institutional voids and market building. De-
spite substantial progress in poverfy alleviation and
an overall economic growth rate of 6 percent in recent
years within Üie country, nearly half of the estimated
156 million inhabitants of Bangladesh live below the
poverfy line (World Bank, 2010). BRAC, considered
to be the world's largest development organization in
reach and staff scale {Economist, 2010; Smillie,
2009),^ is present in all 64 districts of Bangladesh,
operating in about 70,000 villages—a reach that af-
fects the life of 80 percent of the entire population
(BRAC, 2009).
Prevailing institutional configurations in Bangla-
desh act to limit poor, rural inhabitants—particularly
women—from accessing and participating in mar-
kets. These arrangements have a disproportionate im-
pact on access, despite formal constitutional and po-
litical guarantees for the equal status of all
Bangladeshi citizens in all areas of public life (Crow,
2001; Pereira, 2002). Market access and participation
are further complicated by the amalgam of secular
and religious dimensions tíiat define public and eco-
nomic life in Bangladesh (Kabeer, 2000). Such struc-
tural and institutional complexify also poses a seri-
ous impediment to sustaining economic and social
development (Heritage Foundation, 2010).
Bangladesh's institutional arrangements make it
a telling analytic case in which to explore the ex-
perimental and "extreme" nature of rural market-
building processes (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007;
Flyvbjerg, 2011; Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 1994). Our
high-relief observations also support a welcome
agenda of formulating generalizable insights in this
scholarly area. Finally, our case selection responds
well to recent calls for "unconventional" organiza-
^ The original and primary work of BRAG is in Ban-
gladesh. Since 2002 BRAG has also expanded operations
into other countries in Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka), Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Soutbern Su-
dan, Tanzania, and Uganda), and Latin America (Haiti)
with experiments to diffuse its core models.
tional research conducted to develop new knowl-
edge about organizational phenomena (Bamberger
& Pratt, 2010: 665): our emphasis on an organiza-
tion-rich view of market-building processes di-
rectly links organizational theory and studies of
market building representing other perspectives.
The Organizational Case of BRAC
Development researchers t)^ically distinguish
among a set of different development strategies and
orientations among agencies (Körten, 1987). Körten
identified three distinctive orientations: (a) relief and
welfare, (b) local self-reliance, and (c) sustainable sys-
tems development. He further observed that there
exists an "underlying direction of movement that
makes it appropriate to label these orientations as
first, second, and third generation" (Körten, 1987:
147). Although these generations of orientations si-
multaneously coexist within the larger community of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), it is only in
rare cases that they coexist in a single NGO (Körten,
1987). BRAC is one of those rare cases.
Fazle Hasan Abed founded BRAC in 1972 as a
small-scale relief and rehabilitation project in Bangla-
desh after the War of Liberation in 1971 (Chen, 1983;
Smillie, 2009). Over the years, BRAC has shifted in
mission and focus from being a relief operation fo-
cused on strategic development and poverfy allevia-
tion to being a social mobilization organization
rooted in a Marxist tradition, to, most recently, a
poverfy alleviation agent characterized by system
building for and around markets for the least advan-
taged. Currently, BRAC reaches about 80 percent of
the total number of villages in the country via its core
organizing vehicle, the village organization (VO)—a
decentralized model of local activify and
intervention.
BRAC has experimented with an array of differ-
ent activities and programs ranging from micron-
nance, health services, nonformal education, and
human rights and legal aid support. In the 1990s,
BRAC began to incorporate market mechanisms as
a means of poverty alleviation into its primary ap-
proach (Lovell, 1992). In parallel, BRAC shifted
from targeting village-level communities, as was
customary in its 1970s and 1980s programs, to a
near-exclusive focus today on women's economic
empowerment and participation.
Over time, BRAC leadership has come to recog-
nize that access to financial services is an impor-
tant, but insufficient, means of involving poor and
marginalized people in market-based activities
(Mair & Marti, 2009). This recognition led to the
decision to set up social enterprises that facilitate
entrepreneurial efforts and sustainable livelihoods
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in the late 1990s. These enterprises, which include
livestock and fisheries (e.g., dairy, poultry), health
(e.g., iodized salt), and agriculture (e.g., cold stor-
age, sericulture), provide access to assets, support
product marketing, and foster entrepreneurial and
market activities that create local jobs.
BRAC and its contemporary portfolio of market-
based programs provide a useful analj^c opporttmify
to examine market building in a complex institu-
tional context in which market access and participa-
tion are impeded for many. Thus, we focus on
BRAC's initiatives to build inclusive markets and le-
verage market-based activities as they simultaneously
address the complex institutional context.
Data
The data we present come from multiple rounds
of data collection and a variety of sources: partici-
pant observation, retrieval of archival documents,
and in-depth interviews by two of the authors in-
termittently over six years, 2005-11. Between
March 2005 and January 2006, two of the authors
conducted 58 semistructured interviews, primarily
at BRAC offices and in local villages in Bangladesh.
The interviews increased in focus and depth over
the period because of the iterative and ctimulative
nature of the fieldwork process.
We identified informants by sampling from var-
ious programs across multiple hierarchical levels
in BRAC; we sampled within other organizations as
well. The bulk of our interviews were conducted in
English; interviews with Bangla-speaking infor-
mants (primarily participants in rural areas) were
conducted with the assistance of a local interpreter.
Each interview lasted between 20 minutes and
three hours, followed a standard protocol for cap-
turing emerging themes in field research (Spradley,
1979; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), and was audio-re-
corded and later transcribed verbatim.
At the end of the first round of interviews, we
decided to focus our data collection on a few BRAC
programs in greater depth. We applied theoretical
sampling (Denzin, 1989), a recommended approach
for analytical induction (Bansal & Roth, 2000), to
identify these programs. We sought to capture a
broad set of activities and practices as well as dif-
ferent periods in BRAC's strategic development
within the sample. We used the cases to organize
and stimulate data analysis, rather than as a means
to expose variance.
In consultation with BRAC leadership, we se-
lected four programs: Education; Social Develop-
ment; Human Rights and Legal Education (HRLE);
and Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduc-
tion/Targeting the Ultra Poor (CFRP/TUP). Table 1
displays a detailed list of the different data sources
utilized to investigate each of the four target pro-
grams. Each has a distinctive focus, target popula-
tion, and inception date. They are also all ongoing
into the current period. Additionally, each program
took shape at a different point in the evolution of
BRAC's strategies for poverty alleviation. Because
of this, we treat each program as exemplary of a key
challenge regarding market building (Rodrik,
2007). With these selected areas of investigation in
place, we conducted 17 additional interviews be-
tween 2008 and 2010 with internal and external
informants. We used our direct and repeated inter-
view access to the BRAC founder and chairman,
Fazle Abed, to identify program directors for inter-
views. Using these leads as a basis for snowball
sampling (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), we identified a
second set of informants. Using a purposeful sam-
pling strategy (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993),
we sought to uncover key insights or information
about the origins, development, or activities of the
four programs. Throughout the interview phase, we
used a repeated comparison strategy to compare
data across both programs and informants and
identify substantive points of S5aiergy or juxtaposi-
tion (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
As we completed the second set of interviews,
we started to refine emerging themes and asked
respondents to comment directly on specific as-
pects of these nascent findings. We used otir con-
versations with the chairman and the four program
directors to check our analysis. This use of external
informants mitigated the potential biases of any
individual respondent (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick,
1997) and enabled us to induce richer insights from
our aggregate data (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Ap-
pendix A summarizes the final roster of persons
interviewed from BRAC (n = 56) and from other
agencies and sectors [n = 19).
Interviews were supplemented with several pe-
riods of participant observation. Two of the authors
observed a total of 17 meetings, which included
both on-the-ground meetings within the different
BRAC programs (e.g., popular theater performance,
legal education classes) and also meetings at other
organizations (e.g., microcredit meetings, garment
factories). Meeting observation time totaled ap-
proximately 40 hours over the course of the field-
work. During observations, we took field notes on
site and wrote up detailed accounts after each visit.
Field observation notes were not coded in detail
but were used to illuminate the complex nature of
the situation in which BRAC works, particularly
key cultural and situational specificities that
emerged from direct contact with the women in
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TABLE 1
Overview of Focal Programs
Characteristics Education Social Development (SD)
Human Rights and Legal
Education (HRLE)
Challenging the
Frontiers of
Poverty Reduction/'
Targeting the Ultra
Poor (CFPR/rUP)
Main objectives It aims to improve the quality
and delivery of services in
education appropriate to
the needs of poor children,
particularly girls, and to
increase their access to
these services. The purpose
is to help fill the remaining
gaps in coverage, retention,
and quality of compulsory
primary education in
Bangladesh.
Year of inception
Focus on:
Property rights
Autonomy
Archival data
Internal sources
Extemal sources
Number of
audio/video
Number of
interviews
1985
Not directly
Yes
1,700 pages
1,900 pages
3
10
It aims to enhance the human
and social capital of the
poor and marginalized,
especially women, so that
they are aware of their
rights and are empowered
to claim their entitlements
and resist exploitation.
Also it attempts to help
local government to
become more transparent
and responsive to the needs
of Üie poorest.
1986
It aims to protect and
promote human rights
through legal
empowerment and to
ensure access to
justice through both
formal and informal
systems, especially for
the poor and
marginalized.
1998
Not directly but increasingly Yes
important Yes
Yes
1,800 pages i,300 pages
1,600 pages i,200 pages
4 3
It aims to assist the
ultra poor
population
graduate up from
poverty levels
and assist the
ultra poor get
access to the
mainstream
development
programs.
2002
Yes
Yes
1,600 pages
700 pages
2
BRAC programs. Appendix A summarizes the par-
ticipant observation details in full.
In addifion to interviews and observation, we also
collected a wide variety of documents for analysis,
including secondary historical, legal, and polifical
studies. We negoUated access to the extensive docu-
mentafion generated hy BRAC's research department
as well as newsletters and local news articles. For
each of the four focal programs in BRAC, we ohtained
procedural and organizational information, including
descriptions of work tasks, project plans, training
materials, and internal appraisal documents. These
materials provided us with a specific understand-
ing of the institutional context in which BRAC's
market building initiatives are situated. We also
reviewed provisions of the Bangladesh legal frame-
work and a set of specialized legal texts (Pereira,
2002). This review proved especially important be-
cause it permitted us to illuminate the gap hetween
the "in text" and "in reality" embodiments of the
two focal market institutions. Finally, we discussed
legal aspects of market participation with lawyers,
BRAC staff members (some legally trained), and
other NCO field staff.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was conducted in two main stages, a
process that allowed us to go back and forth between
the data and the emerging theoretical arguments
(Miles & Huherman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
Before either stage, we developed a narrative account
of our findings hy chronologically ordering the raw
data. The narrative account included quotes from in-
terviews, documents, annual and committee reports,
and field notes. To corrohorate our understanding of
historical events as reflected in the emerging narra-
tive, we checked the accounts with a set of informants
that included the BRAC founder and chairman, sev-
eral BRAC managers, and independent historians, le-
gal experts, and Islamic scholars. The production of
an historical narrative permitted us to better trace the
history of BRAC's shift from a relief/assistance
organization to a market-focused development
organization.
This historical overview revealed a way to organize
the data around the different BRAC programs. We
used the qualitative analysis software Nvivo 9.0 to
accomplish this analysis. Our primary data set in-
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eluded data from four portfolio programs. We used
data collected on additional BRAC programs to com-
plement and to corroborate these data. Our coding
scheme built out a map and comparison of BRAC
program features, paying particular attention to the
variety of practices that the organization engaged in to
intervene in market building. Our scheme also in-
cluded a categorization of some institutional chal-
lenges evident from theory and data (e.g., patriarchal
system and kinship, political structures, social
norms, religious beliefs) that BRAC addresses in its
efforts to promote women's market access.
Stage 1: Assessing the nature of the institu-
tional voids. In our first stage of formal analysis, we
identified instances of on-the-ground market build-
ing. We grouped these instances into relevant the-
matic categories (performing open coding). In this
work, we built on the Weberian conception of so-
ciety as a multi-institutional space, and specifically
on the classic statement by Friedland and Alford
(1991) that redescribes society not as an integrated
whole, but rather as system of interlinked institu-
tional arenas. Per this view, society comprises sev-
eral distinct spheres of activity, each one built
around a central institutional logic that specifies
distinct meaning systems and orderings of reality,
along with social practices that support each of
these "social worlds." Everyday activities often
take form at the intersection of these spheres,
through contradictions or reinforcement between
logics and practices (Friedland & Alford, 1991;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Our analysis in stage 1
suggested that three central institutional spheres in
rural Bangladesh have direct relevance for market
building: commimity, politics, and religion. This is
consistent with findings from related studies that
focus on the institutional constitution of society,
specifically its economic activities (Campbell,
2004; Greif, 2006; Hamilton & Biggart, 1988;
Heimer, 1999; Thelen, 2004). Moving forward,
again using Nvivo, our analysis identified relevant
bits and pieces of institutions (Schneiberg, 2007)
and assigned each of these instances to one of the
three identified institutional spheres. For instance,
we allocated evidence related to "early marriage,"
"patriarchal system," or "kinship norms of behav-
ior" to the community sphere category.
Once these institutional assignments were com-
plete, we reviewed the data again to refine the
initial categorical assignments. Two BRAC mem-
bers and two independent informants (a legal spe-
cialist and the director of an indigenous NGO in the
field of education) were also asked to verify the
categorization. These outside reviewers agreed on
all the assignments except one, the practice of pur-
dah. One BRAC member suggested that this prac-
tice should be assigned to the community sphere
because it fit there more precisely than in the reli-
gious sphere. Given the high degree of agreement
among the multiple reviewers, as well as corrobo-
ration provided by the literatiure, we sustained oiur
initial decision to assign purdah practices to the
religious sphere.
Using our first research question as a lens (Eisen-
hardt, 1989), we focused our analysis next on iden-
tifying the interfaces between the three spheres and
two focal market institutions. The community, po-
litical, and religious institutional spheres are ana-
lytically distinct and segregated, but in actual prac-
tice, their boundaries blur and interface. Oinr
analytic challenge, then, was to acknowledge the
distinct practices and systems of meaning that
characterize each sphere while closely examining
how their interfaces create possibilities for action.
We intuited that conflicting and potentially contra-
dictory accounts, demands, and solutions that oc-
cur at these interfaces imprint the institutional
voids that configure possible markets.
To develop our empirical analysis regarding this
supposition, we elected to focus on two specific
and well-accepted institutions central to standard
accounts of markets and institutions: property
rights and autonomy. In specific, we wanted to
discover how each the three societal spheres we
identified impacted these two market institutions.
Market economies are understood to rely on the
creation and enforcement of property rights (De
Soto, 2000; La Porta et al., 1998). Property rights
exemplify a governing and stabilizing market insti-
tution (Greif, 2006; Rodrik, 2007) because they de-
termine "the social relationships between owners
and everyone else in society" (Fligstein, 2001: 33).
Regarding autonomy, modem market dealings are
understood to be made by—and only by—autono-
mous actors (McMillan, 2002). As such, autonomy
is an example of what development economists and
experts have called an enabling institution (Sen,
1999): it influences whether individuals are able to
offer their goods and services or benefit firom the
offering. Moreover, both property rights and auton-
omy are legal and institutional outcomes of author-
ity and power relations (Campbell & Lindberg,
1990; Carruthers & Ariovich, 2004; Friedland & Al-
ford, 1991; Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 2009).
These two market institutions provided focal
points for exploration of the institutional interfaces
and market-building challenges identified in the
BRAC data. In our interviews, informants repeat-
edly singled out autonomy as the primary focus of
NGO activity in Bangladesh. Many interviewees
also mentioned that property rights have gradually
gained preeminence as a focus for intervention be-
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cause of the importance of property for women's
self-definition (Nussbaum, 2000). To understand
how the three societal spheres in Bangladesh affect
property and autonomy, we developed a set of nar-
ratives, or detailed memos, to describe each of the
interface possibilities. In total, 17 narratives (ap-
proximately 5-30 single-spaced pages each) were
created; each narrative contained direct quotes as
well as clarifying comments produced by the re-
search team (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). By way of
example, one of the narratives detailed the inter-
face between autonomy and early marriage (associ-
ated with the community sphere). We cross-
checked each narrative with three informants (one
internal to BRAC and two external) to validate their
fidelity with lived experiences.
Stage 2: Surfacing activities in and around the
voids. Our second formal stage of data analysis
focused on investigating BRAC's activities in rela-
tion to the identified institutional interfaces. We
focused specifically on four BRAC programs, as
described above. Although it would have been pos-
sible to focus on a greater number of programs, it
became evident during the initial phase of analysis
that few additional ideas and issues were emerging
when we looked beyond the four portfolio pro-
grams (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We opted for an
intensive analysis of these programs.
Our second stage of analysis comprised three
steps (Pratt, Rockmann, & Kaufmann, 2006). Figure
1 provides a schematic overview of this analytic
process. The first step involved the creation of pro-
visional categories and first-order codes (Van
Maanen, 1979). We used Nvivo to keep track of the
emerging categories and to view similarly coded
texts simultaneously, which helped to manage the
large amount of data. Following the procedures
suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), our first
categorical codes provided descriptive labels for
the different sorts of activities that we observed at
the different interfaces. The codes were largely
built upon the vocabulary of the interviewees,
which included, for instance, "giving voice," "rais-
ing questions," and "building ties with the elites."
Once codes were named and categories developed,
we returned to the data to review categorical fidel-
ity with the data. As Pratt et al. (2006) suggested,
we either corrected a category or reconceptualized
it when the revisited data did not fit it well. For
instance, after several iterations and discussions
we agreed that our initial category "embracing re-
ligious arguments" inaccurately highlighted the
use of religion by BRAG, so we changed it to "de-
mystifying [available religious arguments]."
The second step involved axial coding (Strauss &
Gorbin, 1998), wherein we compared first-order
codes with one another to clarify themes and to
create second-order constructs. This was an induc-
tive, recursive process through which we identified
a set of more abstract, theory-rich constructs. To
illustrate, when comparing the codes referring to
BRAG'S facilitation of conscientization (Freiré,
1970) with codes referring to building knowledge
of repertoires for poor women, we noticed that
BRAG'S work often helped actors develop their ca-
pacity to make sense of their situational context. To
capture this idea we created a second-order con-
struct called "developing sensemaking capacity."
FIGURE 1
Analytical Goding Process to Induce Theoretical Dimensions
First-Order codes Second-Order
Constructs
Aggregate Theoreticial
Dimensions
• Creating spaces for equals
• Creating spaces for unequals
• Tying up with government systems
• Teaming up with social service providers
• Building on local means of issue resolution
• Making use of customary sources of support
• Facilitating conscientization
• Knowledge of repertoires
• Demystifying
• Adopting artistic traditional performances
k
»
»
>
»
Creating spaces for
interaction
Expanding resource
system
(Re)defining local
arrangements
Developing sensemaking
capacity
(Re)combining norms and
traditions
Redefining market
architecture
Legitimating market
actors
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The axial coding was done by individual research-
ers as well as jointly by the research team. The team
met numerous times to create constructs and assess
the categorical fidelity of the emerging codes.
These iterative discussions helped to refine the
code base and to delimit the emerging theory
(Creed, Dejordy, & Lok, 2010; Pratt et al., 2006).
Appendix B provides coding statistics for the key
codes from each of the four portfolio programs.
Finally, in the third step we identified important
dimensions from the sets of second-order con-
structs. For example, some categories looked struc-
tural (e.g., "creating spaces") whereas others ap-
peared cognitive and cultviral (e.g., "recombining
norms and traditions"). Next, we generated alterna-
tive theoretical frameworks to make sense of how
these constructs related to one another and to the
literature on market building. Then we worked
through the relevant insights each provided. We
consolidated these available factors into two broad
theoretical dimensions: "redefining market archi-
tecture" and "legitimating new actors and activi-
ties." The theoretical dimensions resonated with
the data and provide further analytic guidance to
tmderstand BRAC activities to build inclusive mar-
kets. Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of this
process, showing our first-order codes, second-or-
der constructs, and derived theoretical dimensions.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Our analysis explores the resonance between the
views and experiences of people on the ground in
Bangladesh, the abstractions characteristic of the
institutional voids literature, and the conceptual
and practical work involved in market building.
We present our analysis of market building in this
section to illustrate the issues and to develop a
provisional model of inclusive market building.
Our initial findings reinforce the importance of in-
stitutional interfaces, as exemplified when three
institutional spheres (community, politics, reli-
gion) shaping life in rural Bangladesh meet formal
market institutions of property and autonomy.
Our analysis of property rights and autonomy
relative to the institutional interfaces in rural
Bangladesh points to a fresh understanding of in-
stitutional voids as the intermediate outcomes of
conflicting institutional demands, norms, and rein-
forcing mechanisms. Voids occur at an interface
because it is here that different bits and pieces of
institutions (Schneiberg, 2005) collide and recon-
figure spaces for social (and economic) action. Ta-
bles 2 and 3 summarize the three-way interfaces
identified by our analysis and provide illustrative,
direct quotations from our fieldwork. Our investi-
gation of BRAC's initiatives also surfaced two key
sets of market-building activities in and around
institutional voids: (1) redefining market architec-
ture and (2) legitimating new market actors. Tables
4 and 5 present data that describe these two activ-
ities in detail.
Institutional Interfaces: Conflict among
Institutions as a Source of Voids
Property rights. In recent scholarship, property
rights have emerged as a critical pillar of market econ-
omies (De Soto, 2000; North, 1990). The legal corpus
by which Bangladesh is governed includes extensive
legislation regarding property rights. According to the
constitution, citizens are equal with respect to their
entitlement to ownership and protection of property.
Yet numerous studies have characterized Bangladesh
as a country that has poor standards of property rights
(Fernandez & Kraay, 2007; Islam & Asaduzzaman,
2008) and a judiciary system that ineffectively en-
forces these rights (Heritage Foundation, 2010; World
Bank, 2010). Although property rights are established
by law, our analysis shows that they constitute very
weak pillars for markets to act as a means for poverty
alleviation or a vehicle of economic and social prog-
ress. The specifics of this situation are important in
illustrating the effect of institutional interfaces.
Community sphere. Poor women's market- and
nonmarket-based activities in Bangladesh follow the
rules of interaction established by the commimity. In
specific, our data illustrate that institutions that relate
to patriarchal and patrilineal systems, commimify
norms, and kinship norms are in conflict with and
sometimes contradict constitutional properfy rights.
This finding offers a potential explanation for why
formal properfy rights often go tmclaimed and unen-
forced by many sectors of the population and there-
fore govern market activities and transactions weakly
(see Table 2 for examples).
Social organization in Bangladesh is consistent
with typical patriarchal and patrilineal rules and
norms (Kabeer, 2000). The patterns of behavior-and
cognition associated with this social system struc-
ture women's positions in society, impacting both
public and household economies. One informant
assessed the situation of property rights as one in
which women have little control over resources
they own:
Property rights are very unfavorable to women . . .
even if tbey have something in tbeir name, legally, it
is controlled by either husband or sons or whoever,
family member . . . and because of their illiteracy,
backwardness, they CEUinot claim ownersbip. (inter-
view, man, social activist)
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TABLE 2
Institutional Interfaces: Property Rights in Rural Bangladesh"
Community and Societal Sphere Political Sphere Religious Sphere
Patriarchal and patrilineal system
2.1 "The husband believes that his
woman should not own anything
because that would make her powerful."
(interview, man, microcredit officer)
Community norms of behavior
2.2 "We are trying with this new
Alternative Dispute Resolution to
address some of these problems.
However, often women have to face and
are afraid of social sanctions for seeking
justice outside the community and
bypassing the elites." (interview, man,
SD manager)
Kinship norms of behavior
2.3 "Kinship norms argue against the
sale of land generally. Given an option,
a landholder would prefer not to sell
land, especially that belonging to his
father or kin." [BRAG rural studies
series 1: 161)
Patronage
2.7 "In having justice, what really
matters is whether or not you have the
support of a patron . . . and if you have
money to offer to officials . . . or your
patron is willing to give you that
money." (interview, man, microcredit
officer)
Local powers corruption
2.8 "We could not convince dewani
(shalisker) unless we offered them at
least two hundred taka before the
session in village shalish." (man, HRLE
internal document)
Access to formal justice
2.9 "Often we also found that some of
the elite members believed that it would
be bad to involve women in formal
courts because it would reduce the
social status of the victims and of their
family." (interview, man, SD officer)
Access to informal justice
2.10 "Women are not welcome in
shalish because they are said to create
chaos." (interview, man, research
department)
Purdah
2.13 "It is mostly because of social and
religious norms that women do not go to
shalish. They believe that women lose
purdah if they participate in shalish."
(interview, man, local journalist)
Local interpretations of Koran
2.14 "Our observation identified lack of
respect the existing laws of women
rights, specially from imam. It has also
been observed that whenever imam
dissented on these issues, others got an
inherent tendency to keep quiet." (HRLE
internal report)
Islamic pre-emption (shuf a) laws
2.15 "According to the Muslim Shariah
there exists what is called the right of
pre-emption. Among other things, it is
interpreted as forbidding to sell
inherited land outside the family or the
kinship group provided a member of the
family or some kin can offer the market
price." (interview, man, Islamic law
scholar)
' The text and Table 1 give the spelled-out forms of abbreviaüons used here and in subsequent tables.
The patriarchal system in rural Bangladesh rein-
forces norms that confer control of women's prop-
erty, income, and lahor to men. Because of the risk
of social sanction, women often avoid rightful
claims of ownership or inheritance and do not
make use of existing [formal, legal] means to con-
vey and protect property rights. A male BRAC So-
cial Development Program manager explained:
Wives know they must listen to and obey their hus-
bands, and this includes the in-laws. If the woman
would ask for shalish^ or other means of dispute
resolution, immediately community people pass
bad comments towards the woman and also the
whole family, and that damages the social status
within the community.
Kinship norms also constrain women's opportu-
nities to sell and rent assets or property because
they foreclose the possihility of transacting with
members outside kinship groups.
^ Shalish is a community-based, largely informal pro-
cess through which small panels of influential local fig-
ures help resolve community members' disputes and/or
impose sanctions on them.
Political sphere. Village life in Bangladesh is
shaped in important ways by the decisions of local
village councils. Our examination of the interaction
between property rights and the local patterns of in-
fluence (i.e., patronage, corrupfion, and justice pro-
cesses) suggest that rural Bangladesh is characterized
hy strong power asymmetries hetween different seg-
ments of the village. For example, having a patron is
a key factor in favorably resolving asset and property
conflicts. An informant illustrates this point:
Many poor women were exposed to a high risk that
the assets they received would be stolen or dam-
aged. Because of their lack of connections with more
powerful actors . . . these women cannot get the
support of elites as patrons in either formal or infor-
mal—shalish—courts to enforce their own rights
over their assets, (interview, woman, GFPR/TUP
director]
Corruption and hrihery also affect the legal and
practical implementation of property rights (Trans-
parency International of Bangladesh, 2009). Several
of the people we interviewed in rural villages ex-
plained that the police were quick to accept "infor-
mal payments." Women, however, are excluded
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from participating in these practices. As one Social
Development program officer, put it, "Husbands
can bribe the police or lawyers to prevent going to
court," but not women.
Finally, we found that the legal protection of
women's property rights was further impeded by
taken-for-granted beliefs and practices regarding
participation in courts of informal law. As a Social
Development Program coordinator explained, "We
have been long trying to engage our members in
traditional [informal] forms of dealing with con-
flicts [shalish] . . . but it is very difficult since they
are dominated by the male elite, which makes
women's participation rather limited" (see also
quotation 2.9, in Table 2).
Religious sphere. Practices and beliefs associated
with religion also impact the scope and content of
Bangladeshi women's social and economic activities
(Kabeer, 2000). Very often these practices and beliefs
are at odds with modem conceptions of property
rights. Purdah is an exemplary instance of this ten-
sion. Purdah, which literally means "cinlain," refers
to the obligation that Muslim women have to stay
close to their family relations, limit contact with un-
related men, and avoid being visible in public venues
such as the village market or a court (Chen, 1983). In
this way, purdah directly limits women's ability to
claim or protect their property rights.
Local interpretations by rural clergy—i.e., mul-
lahs—often promote a version of Islam that reinforces
norms about virtuous women as docile and submis-
sive. These norms create a set of social expectations
that reinforce women's seclusion and foster the invis-
ibility of women in the public sphere. These religious
interpretations also constrain women's use and en-
forcement of property rights and conflict direcfly
with women's constitutional rights.
When women seek to control assets and re-
sources or participate in formal or informal courts,
these claims are often interpreted as challenges to
religious norms and laws. A male Social Develop-
ment Program manager explained:
In disputes where some people or groups intend to
appropriate some resources that have heen stolen
from a family or a group, there are always excuses
foimd and in many cases fabricated, in stating that a
womem from that family or group has broken the
norms of Islam.
Our data reveal that the interaction between prop-
erty rights and local institutional spheres is both com-
plex and multifaceted. One of the reasons for this is
that the boundaries that separate these societal
spheres are highly permeable (Heimer, 1999). For ex-
ample, traditional kinship norms in Bangladesh, a set
of behaviors that we attributed to the community
sphere, are also reinforced by Islamic pre-emption
laws (shufa), which pertain to the religious sphere.
This interaction of elements across multiple institu-
tional spheres is particularly important to explaining
the weak enforcement of property rights in Bangla-
desh. By way of illustration, Islamic law contains a
provision for the pronouncement of fatwa (religious
opinion), which many clerics and village patriarchs
grossly misuse. Although the High Court made the
practice of fatwa illegal in Bangladesh in 2001, reli-
gious leaders at the local level continue to exercise it
widely (Pereira, 2002). An imam quoted an Intemal
report from the Hinnan Rights and Legal Education
(HRLE) program in an interview that described the
challenges of using alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms when religious-legal practices are so
common:
We cannot give the legitimacy of practicing such
legal rights, which is controversial with Islamic
laws. If we find such activities, we will protest first,
and we will go against whoever goes for so.
Autonomy. As mentioned, scholars fiom differ-
ent research traditions have emphasized the central
role that autonomy plays in market building and
the distributional effects of markets (McMillan,
2002; North, 1990; Sen, 2009). Bangladesh's consti-
tution places women on an equal footing with men
in all dimensions of public life. For example. Arti-
cle 28(1) states that the state shall not discriminate
against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, or place of birth (Pereira, 2002).
However, our data reveal that local community,
political, and religious spheres act to limit wom-
en's autonomy and erode the ability of poor women
to participate in markets.
Community sphere. Women in rural Bangladesh
are socialized to be dependent. Our examination of
the interaction between autonomy and the conunu-
nity sphere illustrates that patriarchal and patrilineal
norms, as well as customs such as early marriage,
stand at odds with constitutional provisions and
modem conceptions of women's autonomy (see Ta-
ble 3 for illustrations). The patriarchal and patrilineal
system is omnipresent in Bangladesh. Women are
"spoken for" first by their fathers, later by their hus-
bands, and finally by their sons, brothers, or other
male relatives. Women are also considered subordi-
nate in most situations. When there is not enough
food to feed an entire family, for example, girls are
given less than their brothers. The husband of a mi-
crocredit borrower articulated, "Girls must be beaten
to maintain strict control." A female manager in
BRAC's Education Program explained further:
Once she is married, a girl has to sacrifice her life.
She has to give service to her husband and family
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TABLE 3
Institutional Interfaces: Autonomy in Rtu-al Bangladesh
Community and Societal Sphere Political Sphere Religious Sphere
Patriarchal and patrilineal system
2.4 "You know, what we are taught
is that a father always wants what
is best for his son and his daughter.
This means he can oblige his
daughter to get married without her
consent." (interview, woman, local
journalist)
Early marriage
2.5 "Parents give much more
attention to their sons' schooling
and education than to their
daughters' education. Parents feel
that the best they can do for their
daughters is to find a good groom
for them. Hence, they start
searching for brides for their
daughters, not for a good school."
(interview, woman, education
program manager)
Community norms of behavior
2.6 "The social stigma attached to
divorce is so pernicious for women
as opposed to men, that a woman
in many cases would remain with
her husband, even though this
would mean an intolerable and
sometimes life-threatening
existence. Frequently a woman has
no choice but to remain in an
unpleasant marriage because in the
alternative she would be destitute,
without any financial or social
means of survival." (interview,
woman, HRLE program, director)
Patronage
2.11 "For instance, to get a position as a
teacher in a public school, while
"education" merits are important, what
really matters is having the support of a
patron." (interview, man, SD
coordinator)
Civil laws
2.12 "Sections 64 and 65 of the
Criminal Procedure Code deal with
the service of summons of person
who cannot be found. . . . Here we
see a law that intentionally bypasses
women, indicating all women lack
agency, all being variations of some
form of pardianishln. In most other
laws the assumption is the thread
into the procedure, sometimes
managing to obscure the normative
assumption." (Pereira, 2002: 8-9)
Purdah
2.16 "Women are imder constant surveillance.
It is necessary to ensure that they do nothing
that brings sharam (shame) to their kin."
(interview, woman, local journalist)
Local interpretations of Koran
2.17 "Well, there exist some progressive
laws in recent years. However, they are
often ineffective because of extraneous
factors. One of the main such factors in the
case of Bangladesh is that of religious
political pressure. Particular religious
attitudes are so entrenched in Bangladeshi
society that they strike at the foundation of
progressive laws and deprive them of much
of their effectiveness." (interview, woman,
HRLE director)
members. She is supposed to follow her husband
whatever he orders to do.
Gustoms related to family and marriage force
women to defer to men, both consciously and un-
consciously, in ways that constrain their auton-
omy. In the case of marriage, fathers make all of the
decisions. In the case of early marriage,* which is
illegal, giving a dowry^ is perceived as a moral
obligation. Since the amount of dowry goes up with
the age of the bride, early marriages are typically
* The legal marriage age in Bangladesh is 21 for boys
and 18 for girls.
^ Dowry refers to the money, goods, or estate that a
woman brings to her husband in marriage. In the last few
decades, the practice of dowry has become widespread,
though supported neither by state law nor personal law.
It is a very common source of violence against women.
favored. Early marriage further reduces women's
autonomy by limiting their access to education.
Gommimity norms also stigmatize divorce, which
heavily restricts a woman's autonomous capacity to
terminate her marriage. Elements from the religious
sphere reinforce marriage norms. In particular, Is-
lamic law accords impose severe conditions on
women seeking divorce by requiring them to un-
dergo a process that is "time-consuming, expensive
and in most of cases socially humiliating for the
woman and her family" (Pereira, 2002: 25).
Political sphere. The public and private life of
poor women in rural Bangladesh is also sharply
influenced by rules and norms associated with pa-
tronage and civil laws. In the countryside, the poor
secure protection from patrons by providing them
services such as proxy voting in elections. In ex-
change, the poor receive remunerated positions or
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opportunities, such as "a position as a teacher in a
public school" (quotation 2.11), access or voice in
shalish processes, social security, or links to public
resources such as food cards or food-for-work pro-
grams (see Matin, 2002). Well-entrenched patron-
client relationships and their resulting asymmetric
exchanges conflict with the quest for women's au-
tonomy in the country. As the director of the CFPR/
TUP program explained.
It comes at the cost of dependency obligations
which may endure over generations and become
demeaning or arduous.
Our data also suggest that different elements of
Bangladesh's legal framework, as constituted by
constitutional law and general law, contradict
Western conceptualizations of autonomy both in
content and spirit. As we pointed out above, the
constitution, especially part III ("Fundamental
Rights"), embodies multiple provisions that grant
rights and reinforce women's autonomy. However,
our examination of institutional interfaces suggests
that constitutional law may be only one of several
forces in play. Several legal scholars have revealed
that different pieces of legislation within the gen-
eral law do contribute to hinder women's auton-
omy. For example.
There are several examples of what I term ultra-
protective laws, impinging on fundamental rights of
women witb impunity, calculatedly taking on only a
selective notion of women's capacity. All of tbese
laws gravely restrict women's rigbt to movement or
choice of emplojrment. For instance, these laws pro-
hibit employment of women and children between
tbe hours of 8 pm and 6 a.m. or other than between
7 a.m. and 8 p.m. (Pereira, 2002: 9)
Religious sphere. Finally, the autonomy of poor
women is severely restricted by many local reli-
gious beliefs and practices. In particular, norms
associated with purdah reinforce the existing gen-
dered division of labor that is prevalent throughout
society. Because women are strictly confined to the
private sphere, they are prevented from becoming
involved in market transactions and income gener-
ation. Even marketing products in public is prohib-
ited for women. As one of our informants, a micro-
credit borrower, explained:
I cannot go to the market. My busband and my son
can go . . . I am a woman.
Women's economic contributions are tradition-
ally restricted to activities that can be performed on
family property, such as rearing poultry or posthar-
vest activities. Selectively, women do disobey the
restrictions of purdah, yet our analysis suggests
that restrictive institutional rules often prevail. One
woman we met in a primary health care office
confessed, "I used to work in the fields at night or
when it was difficult to be seen." However, another
young woman told us that her parents pressured
her to stop working the fields because they were
afraid that she "might fall in love with someone."
According to a female BRAC volunteer health
worker, rural clergy also reinforce norms associated
with the practice of purdah, solidifying the com-
monly held belief that "Allah made women
weaker." Although this interpretation can be un-
derstood as the enforcement of a religious tenet, it
is also appears as a clear cultural exemplar of men
trying to consolidate their power and reinforce pa-
triarchal structures.
Up to this point in our analysis we have looked at
how the two focal institutions of properfy rights and
autonomy are often contradict and conflict with ex-
isting beliefs and practices associated with the com-
munify, political, and religious spheres in Bangla-
desh. As a result of our investigation, we suggest that
contexts such as Bangladesh can be seen as an area
where multiple institutions exist simultaneously to
shape market dynamics rather than as a locale devoid
of institutions. One informant, a male social activist,
articulated this thesis as follows:
Of course we bave laws on property rights; of course
women are, in theory, equal before the law in our
constitution. The issue is not that we have few in-
stitutions, but tbat we bave way too many! And
often, well almost always, the ones tbat matter in
our communities go against women baving a more
active role in society, in markets, at bome, etc.
The lack of primacy regarding market institu-
tions is due to the plurality of institutions that
support local action. As evident from our infor-
mants, local practices and beliefs interact with
Western conceptions of market logics; coding this
interaction as simply "weakness" or "absence" of
modern market institutions misspecifies the situa-
tion and underrecognizes the significance of the
institutional plurality.
The results of our analysis provide evidence for a
theory that institutional voids are situated, inter-
mediate outcomes of contestation at institutional
interfaces. Rather than empty spaces, institutional
voids are, we suggest, dynamic spaces reconfigured
by conflicting and contradictory institution flux.
We emphasize the situated and intermediate fea-
tures of voids as a way of better understanding why
and how market exclusion occurs. This insight also
serves as a starting point for both practical and
policy-related efforts to build inclusive markets.
Next, we report findings from our analysis of the
on-the-ground activities by BRAC as its members
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have endeavored to build inclusive markets in re-
cent years in a context of institutional plurality and
complexity.
Building Inclusive Markets
Building on data from our four identified BRAC
programs, we found two broad repertoires of inter-
ventions that address the indeterminacy of the key
market institutions, private property and autono-
my: (1) activities that redefine market architectinre
and (2) activities that legitimate new actors. "Rede-
fining market architecture" refers to the renegotia-
tion of existing institutional arrangements to define
who can access and participate in markets and
under which conditions. "Legitimating activities"
include building awareness and identity as well
constructing social narratives that support and au-
thorize women's roles in and access to markets.
Redefining market architecture. Within the
larger category of activities that redefine market
architecture, our analysis exposed three sets of ac-
tivities (second-order constructs) that BRAC en-
gages in that provide structural interventions
within a complex institutional context. Table 4
maps the relevant first-order codes to direct quota-
tions from BRAC workers, beneficiaries, experts,
and policy observers that illuminate these activi-
ties. Appendix B displays descriptive statistics for
the complete set of codes related to the BRAC pro-
grams in our analysis.
Create (social) spaces for interaction. The first
set of activities within the frame of market archi-
tecture redefinition correspond to the construct
"creating spaces for interaction." These activities
consist of building platforms for interaction and
dialogue. This second-order construct aggregates
two first-order codes: creating "spaces of equals"
and creating "spaces of unequals."
From its beginning, BRAC's social mobilization
approach has been an attempt to build equal rather
than hierarchical communities. The objective has
been to create "free places" (Goffman, 1961) in
which women feel they belong—places that con-
tribute to the development of women's sense of self
and break women's dominant relations of depen-
dence. For instance, in referring to BRAC's village
organizations (VOs), a VO member told us that
"[we] had learned how to get together and help
each other." VOs, which consist of 35 to 50 women
from a single village, are seen by BRAC as "the key"
and "the base" of their activities (quotation 3.2)
because of their ability to redefine women's tradi-
tionally passive roles. Building these VO spaces
requires a small, but continuous, set of interactions.
According to Social Development Program organizer:
Then you have a small group in another community
then you ultimately expand the small group into the
village level and then you meet the VO each and
every day, well formally once a week in a meeting
setup. But informally, everyday day and night,
morning and evening you're visiting and you are
having contact with them. That is how you're be-
coming very close to them and part of them. That is
how it begins.
These spaces for equals isolate and "de-inte-
grate" (Touraine, 1995) women from their tradi-
tional positions and encourage them to take social
action.
BRAC also builds spaces for "unequals" to re-
integrate women into arenas where traditional
relations, roles, and practices can be understood
as elements of a negotiated and negotiable order
(Strauss, 1978). The Village Poverty Reduction
Committees [Gram Daridro Bimochon Commit-
tees, or GDBCs) are examples of these spaces for
unequals. These include members of the local
elite along with members of BRAC, VO women,,
and the ultra poor. These spaces are contingent,,
tentative, and carefully managed by BRAC be-
cause they often create conflicts at political, cog-
nitive, and emotional levels by their very nature.
BRAC facilitates consensual solutions by helping
elites to reinterpret their support for women rather
than withdraw it. The CFPR/TUP program director
explained further:
Tbe language we use in motivating them [the elites],
is the most important aspect... we tell them, listen,
we are a stranger here in your village, but yon are the
people wbo have been supporting them for hun-
dreds and hundreds of years. Otherwise it would be
very, very difficult to mobilize them and have them
sitting with tbe ultra poor women.
Outreach to existing systems of services provid-
ers. The second category of activities that emerged
from our analysis highlights the way that BRAC
reaches out to existing service provision systems.
This second-order construct aggregates the first-
order codes "tying up with government systems"
and "teaming up with social service providers." As
our prior analysis shows, women are often impeded
from accessing many of the structures, services, and
organizations that exist to support them (i.e., judi-
ciary, education, health services). To address and
modify such restricted access, BRAC has worked to
"build partnerships and referral linkages with the
Government" (quotation 3.12). One example of this
activity is the primary education school BRAC de-
veloped when it recognized that interrupted edu-
cation was a major issue impacting the develop-
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ment of girls' autonomy. A female Education
Program manager told us:
Well, this was for children (70 percent of girls and
30 percent of boys] who had dropped out from the
government school or who do not have access to
government school. And these children are defini-
tively poor from rural areas. They will be in school
for one year, and after the conclusion of the program
they will go to the government public schools, not to
BRAG schools.
BRAC also teams up with service providers out-
side the government, such as NCOs. These alli-
ances serve to increase women's "exit options"
(Nussbaum, 2000). According to research, a woman
is far more likely to stand up to ahuse if she is able
to read and access alternative means of issue reso-
lution, such as legal aid clinics, employment coop-
eratives, and traditional healers. BRAC's partner-
ship with Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK), a legal aid
and human rights organization, exemplifies this
form of outreach. An internal document from the
HRLE program elaborates on the nature and ohjec-
tives of such collaboration:
BRAG-ASK joint legal aid program is designed as a
partnership. ASK provides orientation and training
to BRAG staff . . . to familiarize them with existing
laws, court procedures, eind filing of cases at the
police station.
Purposeful integration of BRAC initiatives with
existing local support structures. The third activ-
ity we observed was the purposeful way that BRAC
integrated local support structures into its various
programs. The second-order construct labeled
"(Re)defining local arrangements" aggregates two
first-order codes: "Building on local means of issue
resolution" and "making use of customary sources
of social support." According to our analysis, mak-
ing market access and participation for women pos-
sible seems to require learning about, making use
of, and adapting to prevailing institutional arrange-
ments—even if they are considered to be dysfunc-
tional or if they reinforce patterns of exclusion.
Access to formal justice is tedious, costly, and
frequently unavailable to women, as described
above. As an alternative, BRAC attempts to engage
its members in shalish, a "traditional form of deal-
ing with conflicts" (quotation 3.18) when issues
such as "land, divorce, illicit relationships, or
fights hetween individuals" (quotation 3.19) arise.
A BRAC Social Development Program man-
ager said:
Shalish serves the needs of the villagers . . . well, we
know this is not the whole picture. Many times they
are not fair and can be degrading, but we also know
that it is what the poor people prefer. We know also
that they see the memhers of the shalish court as
closer to them and that they speak in a language they
(the poor people] can imderstand.
In promoting the use of shalish under certain
conditions, BRAC acknowledges that the needs of
poor women might well he served by alternative,
local sets of arrangements (Unger, 1998). Similarly,
BRAC recognizes and incorporates the value of ex-
isting "older, village-hased practices of assistance
to the poor" (quotation 3.23) into its programs. This
is a radical departure from BRAC's traditional ap-
proach to poverty alleviation, since it makes use of
practices that are thought to perpetuate relation-
ships of dependence. As the director of the CFPR/
TUP program explained:
We thought that undermining older, village-hased
practices of assistance to the poor would . . . reduce
their already rather limited sources of support. But
it's good that we learned from our field and re-
sponded immediately . . . we asked (the village
committee] to stand up for the women in shalish
processes, in ensuring the education of the children
of our ultra-poor members . . . to ensure . . . that
whatever support they are providing to the commu-
nity . . . in a more organized, in an even more
popular manner, will... produce a more long-term,
sustainable result.
In sum, we have identified a set of activities that
redefine market architecture in ways that hegin to
allow poor women to engage in markets and market-
based activities. Our analysis reveals how BRAC has
shifted the boundaries of spaces and activities to be
more accessible and available to women. BRAC ac-
complishes this redefinition by extending resource
and support systems and building various platforms.
In so doing, BRAC brings poor women into posifions
that have the potential for increased discretion and
autonomy at the local level.
However, development scholars and practitioners
have long warned about the limits of this narrow type
of liberation and empowerment (Nussbaum, 2000;
Sen, 1999). Although these arrangements may tem-
porarily ameliorate local difficulties, deeper, more
taken-for-granted institutions that "identify catego-
ries of social actors and their appropriate activities
or relationships" (Barley & Tolhert, 1997: 97) can
remain unchanged. Our findings highlight a second
set of activities that deepen and embed market-
supporting institutional infrastructures into local
institutional arrangements. This set of market-
building activities focuses directly on legitimating
women as market actors.
Legitimating new market actors. We found that
BRAC engaged in two specific types of activities
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(second-order constructs] that legitimate women's
access and participation in markets. Tahle 5 pro-
vides quotations from our data that illustrate each
of these activities along with the corresponding
first-order codes. Appendix B displays statistics for
the key codes used to categorize these instances
within the BRAC program data.
Develop "sensemaking" capacity. The first set
of legitimating activities we foiuid, "developing
sensemaking capacity," aggregates the two first-or-
TABLE 5
Data Supporting the Theme of Legitimating New Market Actors
Developing Sensemaking Capacity
Program
Facilitating
Conscientization Knowledge of Repertories
(Re)combining Norms and Traditions
Adopting Artistic
Demystifying Traditional Performances
Education 4.1 "In our education
programs, one of our
main objectives is to help
them to collect and reflect
on their experiences,
what they know, the work
they do, that their parents
did. This is important to
increase their dignity.
And of course, creating
the VO is the key. They
have to learn that it is
their organization, that
they manage it."
(interview, woman.
Education manager)
Social
Development
4.2 "IWe always] start with
the VO. It is the tool that
permits the women to
start thinking ahout their
prohlems and their lives.
Also to start thinking
about what they can do if
the work together. This is
how we have always
understood our work, like
Freiré. It has to contribute
to raising awareness and
start breaking unequal
relationships." (interview,
man, SD manager)
4.5 "These are people
where maybe they're not
able to see that they are
not ignorant. They can
think, and they can build
up their own, you know,
you can facilitate it. So, a
teacher, she or he is a
facilitator in a common
thinking process to
improve understanding
among people, and so we
still believe that it's action
and refraction which
provides the knowledge,
the source of knowledge
and not from books or
from other people; the
source of knowledge is
intemal. You act and
refract and your
knowledge, sort of, comes
from a process of action
and refraction rather than
from books." (interview,
man, chairman)
4.6 "So what the women
members of the Palli
Shamajs have realized is
that they can include
themselves as members of
the local committees, the
mosque committee,
madrasa committee,
school committee. And
many have succeeded . . .
so they then become more
powerful." (interview,
man, SD program officer)
4.9 "With the local
community leaders
workshops what we try to
do is basically to
convince the other
structvires, apart for the
power structure, that
we're trying to develop
the villages. . . . We invite
all of them to come and
to help our organization:
what should we do,
basically to have, to try to
convince them to work as
a support group for these
poor people, as a kind of
support group for these
poor people. We also talk
about the laws we teach
and that they are not
contradictory to religious
Islamic laws." (interview,
man, SD manager)
4.10 "When POs visit
households, they are
usually offered with
chairs or stools to sit.
However, as a matter of
strategy, POs instead of
sitting on stool/chair, sit
on the ground. This
makes the people
embarrassed, but happy!
They are embarrassed
because they are not used
to seeing an educated
outsider sitting on the
ground with them. But
they are happy because
the PO sits with them in
an informal way as a
nearer one which creates a
fellow feeling among them
and the gap becomes
narrower." (Social
Development report)
4.13 "Popular theatre also
attempts to engender
building a different
system of education
within the community—
nonformal education
accessible to all. Implying
that it does not rely on
literacy—that would at
once exclude the vast
majority of the poor. It is
a process centered round
the people, starting and
ending with the
expressive potential of
the human body. Thus,
learning over here is more
than entertainment, as the
process of learning is
user-friendly. Popular
theatre is inexpensive to
organize as it does not
require an expensive
outlay in equipment or
infrastructure."
(education report)
4.14 "It comes fi-om our
folk, popular culture. We
realized we can use it as
a communication tool,
communication network.
As in the early days there
was no electricity, no
radio, no television,
people used to do this
kind of drama in the rural
areas. So we actually
went back to borrow this
idea. People have nothing
else to do, so they come
and see the drama. People
love to see, and through
this people can become
educated, more aware
about their situation, their
rights, their problems,
issues." (interview, man,
SD manager)
Continued
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TABLE 5
(Continued)
Program
Developing Sensemaking Capacity [Re)combining Norms and Traditions
Facilitating
Conscientization Knowledge of Repertories Demystifying
Adopting Artistic
Traditional Performances
HRLE
CFPR/TUP
4.3 "It is very difficult to
stop early marriage, so
now we organize
community workshops
with imams, religious
people, with those who
hold power in the
community. We are
creating awareness among
stakeholders, like
religious leaders, etc."
(interview, woman, HRLE
director)
4.4 "The objective is
awareness about gender
norms and relations;
better understanding of
rationality of joint
ownership by men and
women of family
resources and women's
participation in decision-
making in the family."
(interview, woman,
CFPR/TUP director)
4.7 "In our training
programs one of our
objectives is to help them
to collect and reflect on
their experiences, what
they know, the work they
do, that their parents did.
This is important to
increase their dignity.
And of course, creating
the VO is the key. They
have to learn that it is
their organization, that
they manage it."
(interview, woman, HRLE
director)
4.8 "Understanding that
knowing the law and
rights is not enough for
seeking redress—one has
to know where to go, who
can help, what do. To
help women gain basic
legal skills." (interview,
man, CFPR/TUP senior
program officer)
4.11 "Our objective with
the HRLE Program is,
mostly, to let the poor
know their own rights,
that they have the law
and human rights. And
also to convince them
that they can ask for these
rights, and fight for them.
In a way, we want to
demystify the law."
(interview, man. Social
Development manager)
4.12 "To convince elites to
participate in the
committees (GBDCs), we
explain the tasks and
activities in terms that are
very close to common
understandings of the
traditional and religious
obligation they have to
help the poor."
(interview, man, CFPR
senior program officer)
4.15 "But popular theatre
also has problems. We
believe that it is very
important to have actors
that are women. But
sometimes religious
leaders or the village
leaders are against it,
because there are women
acting and also because
they think that the topics
are not correct. However,
actors and also program
organizers resist that
opposition. They talk
about how important it is
to talk about problems
that the poor have, but
also problems of
sanitation, violence."
(interview, woman, HRLE
and Advocacy
coordinator)
4.16 'The theaters not only
view society as a
dichotomy of good and
bad where the latter
oppresses the former, but
by following the trend of
popular theater highlights
the cause of the
oppressed in the society.
The theatres not only
highlighted the
implication of the
problems, but also the
causes behind the
problems, and most
importantly hinted on
how these problems
could be resolved."
(CFPR/TUP report)
der codes "facilitating conscientization" and
"knowledge of repertoires." "Gonscientization" re-
fers to efforts to build awareness by provoking in-
dividual and collective self-reflection (Freiré, 1970).
Gonfronted with the strong inner sense of nonentitle-
ment that women have, BRAG starts by leading
women to think about their lives. In the words of a
male Social Development Program manager:
This is a . . . two stage process. First they would
come to see themselves as in a bad situation, op-
pressed; and then would come to see themselves as
citizens who had a right to a better situation.
BRAG'S use of the term "conscientization" stems
from the deep influence that the Brazilian educator
Freire's (1970) work had on Fazle Abed. Activities
that trigger conscientization aim to provoke women
into seeing and questioning their condition so that
they can begin "de-naturalizing" it (Douglas, 1986).
Gonscientization processes involve wonien's be-
coming aware of their own sense of self and visu-
alizing the possibilities for expanding the boundar-
ies of permissible behavior. To develop women's
sensemaking in this direction, BRAG works to gen-
erate a repertoire of resources and inner capabili-
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ties for women to mobilize (Nussbaum, 2000). Mar-
tha Chen, an early BRAC staffer, wrote in a note in
1976 (published later in 1983):
These village women possess many skills. They
must be made to feel these skills are valuable. Then
the women must decide for themselves what they
can and want to do. (Ghen, 1983)
BRAC also provides tools, skills, and resources
for women. These tools and resources range from
basic math and accounting training to more sub-
stantial knowledge lessons about citizen rights. For
instance, referring to a new initiative by the HRLE
Program to empower poor women through property
rights, the program director explained:
Before property rights can empower people, people
must be empowered to claim their property rights.
Our legal literacy courses combine legal aid witb
rigbts articulation, taking legal empowerment be-
yond courts and to hands-on application at the
grassroots.
(Re)combine norms and traditions. Developing
women's sensemaking capacity is inherently polit-
ical. BRAC's efforts to build self-awareness and
foster women's mobilization are not uncontrover-
sial and often generate opposition. In response,
BRAC works to provide alternative definitions to
traditional notions such as "household property."
This second type of legitimating work is about
"(re)combining norms and traditions" and aggre-
gates the two first-order codes, "demystifying" and
"adopting artistic traditional performances." Our
epigraph at the beginning of this paper, from the
work of Marta Nussbaum on human capabilities,
provides a direct statement of the rationale for
these activities.
Efforts to change prevailing institutionalized
practices, customs, and beliefs challenge many
conventions and sometimes breed opposition. A
very graphic example of this occurred in the 1990s,
when 110 BRAC schools were set on fire by radicals
who used religious arguments to claim that mixing
boys and girls in class violated the values and
norms of Bangladeshi society (Riaz, 2005). Opposi-
tion can be understood as an expression against
dominant actors' produced meanings—meanings
that articulate implicit hierarchies, reproduce their
advantages, and stabilize a particular "local world"
(Fligstein, 2001; Tilly, 1998).
The evidence from our informants suggests that
in traditional arrangements, women are often so-
cialized to occupy and treated as holding depen-
dent positions. Our analysis suggests that BRAC's
engagement with poor women via participation in
VOs denaturalizes and demystifies the traditional
relations of male-female subordination and patron-
age and helps women feel at ease in the company of
nonfamily "strangers." As the following quote from
an internal report from the Social Development
Program illustrates, this démystification is
purposeful:
When Program Organizers visit households, tbey are
usually offered with chairs or stools to sit. However,
as a matter of strategy, POs instead of sitting on
stool/chair, sit on the ground. This makes the people
embarrassed, but bappy! They are embarrassed be-
cause they are not used to see an educated outsider
sitting on the ground witb tbem. But tbey are bappy
because the PO sits with tbem in an informal way.
Then tbe gap between them becomes narrower.
BRAC also works with women to demystify their
view of the law as opaque, out of reach, and inap-
plicable to themselves. In HRLE training in partic-
ular, women discuss and learn that the law is not
necessarily "contradictory to Islamic religious law"
(quotation 4.9).
BRAC also works with local elites—e.g., village
chiefs, religious leaders, teachers, policemen—to
demystify BRAC's own interventions. For example,
when CFPR program organizers approach elites to
provide support to women (e.g., granting fair jus-
tice in traditional shalish), they emphasize that
such support is nothing more than a more formal-
ized version of what the local elites have always
been responsible for in the community. The CFPR
director told us:
First of all we acknowledged their contribution to
their community, so they come to see what we ask
them to do as notbing extraordineiry, but . . . wbat
their father did.
In addition, BRAC carefully uses religious argu-
ments to support its own initiatives, such as fram-
ing elite support for the poor in "terms very close to
common understandings of the [elites'] traditional
and religious obligation." A local journalist
explained:
It directly resonates with one of the Five Pillars of
Islam, which states that the rich have a moral obli-
gation to belp tbe needy.
The issue of public framing and presentation is
important when dealing with institutions such as
women's autonomy and property rights. We ob-
served that BRAC purposively draws upon and in-
tegrates traditional artistic and cultural perfor-
mances in its activities. These actions facilitate
sensemaking and help to legitimize discourse that
favors inclusion. This integration can also be inter-
preted as an experiment with old rules and prac-
tices that attempts to make sense of new situations
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(Fligstein, 2001). For instance, BRAC draws on
Bangladesh's rich popular folk culture by incorpo-
rating popular theater performances into its advo-
cacy efforts and educational projects. Theater pro-
vides a medium for discussing controversial issues
that all villagers understand. A Social Development
manager referred to theater's ability to
ease the public discussion about issues such as
domination and exploitation, land grabbing, women
discrimination, village arbitration, or harassment
of women.
Elaborating on the plot of a performance one of the
authors attended that gathered 300 people, includ-
ing local government members and a religious
leader, the manager further recalled:
Someone is beating his wife, they know there is this
problem in the village, because they are from there.
They take story, and they represent the drama and
they ask to the audience: Do you think this should
be done? Should he beat bis wife? And at the end of
tbe drama tbey ask to tbe audience, what can be
learned from this drama?
Thus, via the highly legitimized institution of pop-
ular theater, BRAC introduces a new image of wom-
en's autonomy into a community and provides a
venue that safely fosters debate about community
norms, appropriate behaviors, and the evolution of
old practices. Furthermore, by employing the me-
dium of theater, BRAC not only permits viewers to
visualize this new realify and its possible implica-
tions, but also creates a reason to discuss the causes
and potential responses for the situations on display.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper centers on market building in institu-
tionally complex contexts. Our analysis of the in-
stitutional context in Bangladesh and the activities
of BRAC allow us to develop a grounded theory of
institutional voids built on a rich empirical case in
which market building is being undertaken as a
tool for economic and social development. We now
elaborate on how our findings contribute to and
extend existing institutional accounts of the forma-
tion and functioning of markets.
From Institutional Voids to Institutional
Interfaces
There may well be some instances and arenas
that are "empty" of institutional arrangements;
however, they are uncommon. Although the ex-
treme nature of such instances makes them poten-
tially useful for analysis, our study focuses not on
the absence and weakness of modern market insti-
tutions but rather on their "situatedness" within a
multi-institutional context—constituting what we
have called an "institutionally complex context"
(Greenwood, Magán, Li, & Céspedes, 2010; Greif,
2006). The unitary view of voids makes it difficult
to imagine how markets can be built or operate
within anything other than a very narrow set of
institutional contexts. This view also reinforces a
compensatory view of institutional arrangements,
rather than recognizing how indigenous institu-
tions do support varied complex market activities
and governance (Ostrom, 1990; Pierson & Skocpol,
2002). Our research enables a move away from
abstraction toward a grounded knowledge of insti-
tutional voids shaped by investigating how they
take form and are managed in the process of market
building. We arrived at this insight by acknowledg-
ing the existence of multiple institutional logics
and analytically identifying interfaces as the points
at which these logics come together. This perspec-
tive made it possible to conduct a fine-grained
examination of two core institutions related to
market creation and stability: property rights and
autonomy.
Our data reveal that property rights and autono-
my—taken for granted as pillars of markets in mod-
ern societies and economies—often contradict and
thus stand in conflict with existing rules of the
game in local community (e.g., patriarchy, early
forced marriage), political (e.g., corruption and pa-
tronage), and religious (e.g., interpretations of reli-
gious credos, purdah) spheres in Bangladesh.
These institutional interfaces configure exclusion-
ary markets, a point we note is secondary in the
literature on institutional voids and merely noted
in passing by institutional economists concerned
with distributional outcomes of markets. The ap-
proach introduced in this study focuses on those
who are denied the chance to "play the game" and
explains how many poor women in Bangladesh are
excluded from market-based activities.
Attention to the interfaces between market insti-
tutions and local institutional arrangements has at
least two important implications for the study of
institutional voids. First, our analysis illustrates
the importance of looking at a full array of inter-
linked institutional spheres (Friedland & Alford,
1991). Understanding what prevents women fiom
accessing and participating in markets permits us
to see how various institutional logics shape exist-
ing rules of the game (North, 1990). Our findings
that patriarchal systems, religious beliefs, and local
conceptions of "proper" behavior limit women's
access to and participation in markets suggests that
existing institutional arrangements, and the result-
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ing institutional voids, can be seen as outcomes of
cultural and political contention among actors with
differential power and competing frames (Bartley,
2007; Camphell, 2004; Rao, 1998). We show that
the protection of property rights is variahly granted
by the powerful to some but not to others. As a
result, the institutional arrangements that shape
institutional voids can be understood as relatively
durable, but contestable, compromises based on
specific coalitional dynamics that are potentially
vulnerable to shifts.
Second, our focus and mapping of both market
and nonmarket institutions specifies more fully the
institutional arrangements relevant for understand-
ing market-based activities in developing coun-
tries. In referring to bottom of the pyramid markets,
Wehh et al. pointed out that there is "little to no
property rights protection available in the event of
violations" (2010: 506). Our analysis suggests that
alternatives such as traditional means of issue res-
olution have consequences for market building and
access. Not only do these alternative mechanisms
exist, but they are often preferred by local actors
because of their cultural and cognitive proximity
and ease of use. Of course, such mechanisms are
not ideal; as we show, they are often captured hy
dominant actors and serve to reproduce existing
patterns of subordination and exclusion. However,
our investigation of BRAC's interventions shows
that it is not always necessary to create replicas of
Western institutions when they are ahsent or weak.
Rather, adding to one of the main lessons derived
from developing countries (Rodrik, 2007) and
"marketization" processes in Eastern Europe
(Kogut et al., 2000; Stark, 1996), we echo Dixit, who
wrote "It may be possible to work with such alter-
native institutions as are available, and build on
them" (2004: 4).
In sum, we propose that apparent institutional
voids can be seen as useful problem-sensing
tools. They can help to diagnose conditions that
need to be addressed for inclusive market initia-
tives to develop. They are analytical spaces (Ma-
honey & Thelen, 2010) in which elements from a
variety of institutional spheres, each built around
central systems of meanings and social practices
(Friedland & Alford, 1991), come together and
affect the interpretation, enforcement, or embodi-
ment of certain focal institutions—such as, in our
case, property rights and autonomy (Carruthers &
Ariovich, 2004).
On the Work of Building Inclusive Markets
This article builds on existing scholarship on
markets and institutions but refocuses on actors
and activities on the ground. In contrast to previous
work that highlights the role of the state, firms,
social movements, or entrepreneurs in market-
building processes, we begin with a focus on a key
intermediary actor, BRAC, hut we also provide a
more detailed analysis of a range of individual ac-
tors and communities, along with various inhahit-
ants of existing social structures and institutional
logics. We focus on market building, not simply
market formation, to emphasize the activity and
processes involved. And we also focus on market
building that has the explicit purpose of including
the formerly excluded.
Our reading of autonomy and property rights as
void for many hecomes the starting point for exam-
ining BRAC's efforts to huild inclusive markets.
Like other liminal spaces, the interfaces we exam-
ine represent spaces that illuminate the conflict
that occurs over and within institutions (Mahoney
& Thelen, 2010; Morrill, 2006). These interfaces,
though seemingly fixed in many ways, are also
unstable and contested, and therefore represent op-
portunities for actors to create and transform the
relations, boundaries, or rules of the game within
them (Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006;
Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Our approach reflects
the centrality of such microsocial processes, inter-
actions, and (re)negotiations for understanding
how institutions "act and play" (Barley, 2008).
We find that on-the-ground market-huilding ac-
tivities situated in institutionally complex contexts
enable market access and participation through the
renegotiation of existing social orders. An interme-
diary organization initiates this process of renego-
tiation, hut it unfolds on behalf of and with the
people affected, the marginalized (poor women)
and the ones who marginalize (elites, religious
leaders, etc.). It includes two distinct categories of
activities: redefining market architecture and legit-
imating new actors.
Our findings support a perspective on market
huilding in which markets are viewed as built
along with rather than on top of existing local in-
stitutions and that allows "markets to hecome"
rather than pushes for "markets to exist." In con-
trast to previous work, we integrate market conse-
quences into our argument. This move underscores
the value of attending to plural institutional
spheres and provides a more complete understand-
ing of how markets form, how intermediaries im-
pact markets, and why it is important to take into
account dimensions of inclusiveness. This perspec-
tive suggests that the inclusive market that BRAC is
striving to build amalgamates with the existing lo-
cal institutional arrangements rather than consti-
tuting an isolated institutional sphere.
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Our findings illustrate how market-huilding ac-
tivities are located at the interfaces of institutional
spheres and how they often modify existing norms,
heliefs, and practices to alter the imderlying social
order (Strauss, 1982). Our study sees market access
and participation as negotiable and market hound-
aries as potentially permeable for actors who have
been excluded. These findings and interpretations
reinforce ongoing conversations ahout inhabited
institutions (Barley, 2008; Hallett, 2010; Scully &
Creed, 1999).
Our findings related to redefining market archi-
tecture extend the current view that markets can
adopt different architectiu-es. According to the so-
ciology of markets literature, markets and their sup-
porting institutions are built through rules, conven-
tions, and the codification of meaning in the form
of standards (Beckert, 2007; Biggart & Beamish,
2003; Fourcade, 2007). Once a particular architec-
ttu-al configuration takes form, it defines who can
do what and who has access to what, and it be-
comes difficult to stray from the configuration
(Fligstein, 2001).
This stream of work emphasizes market struc-
tures, however, in ways that are sometimes overly
stylized or abstract. Instead, we suggest that atten-
tion to negotiation activities surrounding existing
institutional patterns can show how inclusive mar-
kets can be renegotiated even from initially restric-
tive structures (e.g., to formal justice). Moreover,
focusing on market architecture highlights the piv-
otal role that different types of social spaces play
relative to market building. Some purposively de-
signed spaces may be privileged settings in which
individuals from disparate groups can (re)negotiate
existing social orders and seek microinstitutional
change. Recent work by social movement scholars
(PoUeta, 1999) and organizational theorists (Kel-
logg, 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) suggests the
importance of different social spaces for these ends.
Our findings speak to and provide an empirical
path to continue these conversations.
Our analysis also reveals how purposeful effort
to legitimate new market actors complements ini-
tiatives to define and shape market architecture.
Our findings echo perspectives in entrepreneur-
ship that combine legitimacy and cognitive-based
strategies and suggest that persuasion and infiu-
ence can be used to overcome the skepticism and
resistance of those who guard the status quo (Al-
drich & Fiol, 1994). In addition, various studies
have shown how actors bestow legitimacy on prac-
tices, products, and services (Suchman, 1995;
Vaara & Tienari, 2008) by using speaking and writ-
ing (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 56), rhetoric
(Creen, 2004; Suddaby & Creenwood, 2005), or
analogies and metaphors (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010;
Hargadon & Douglas, 2001).
In line with this tradition, our study illustrates
how rhetorical strategies and culture can be used as
a tool kit (Swidler, 1986) (e.g., popular theater per-
formances; local means of issue resolution) and can
be actively and strategically deployed by an inter-
mediary actor to convey legitimacy. Moreover, our
study allows for an in-depth look at how legitimacy
is constructed and negotiated (Barley, 2008;
Strauss, 1982). "As institutional analysis takes its
interpretive turn, it is well worth remembering that
writing, reading and rhetoric are important for ne-
gotiating legitimacy, but words break no bones"
(Barley, 2008: 507). Our study represents an at-
tempt to do so by applying a more diverse reper-
toire of methods (see also Dover & Lawrence, 2010)
to study institutions inhabited and at play in less
than comfortable or conventional contexts (Bam-
berger & Pratt, 2010).
Limitations and Conclusions
This study reports on the activities of BRAC to
build inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh. We do
not intend to claim that our findings represent the
only way in which inclusive markets might be
built. In fact, we do not believe that there is only
one way to build markets (Rodrik, 2007). Our in-
tention was to illustrate how exclusion from market
activities can be traced back to institutional voids
and to surface the microprocesses involved in
building inclusive markets by examining the activ-
ities and role of an intermediary.
Markets are not constructed de novo (Stark,
1996). The choice of setting and the local condi-
tions exemplified in this case restrict the general-
izability and transferability of its findings, particu-
larly with regard to modern societies in which
processes of secularization have diminished the
centrality of religious institutions and to societies
in which what we call the emporium of the law
grants inclusion effectively. However, our analyti-
cal approach of spotting possible voids and theo-
retical insights on the negotiated order of market
access and permeability of market boundaries
might provide a useful lens for researchers and
decision makers studying a variety of phenomena.
For example, the recent demographic shifts and the
consequent rise of "Islamic banking" in Europe rep-
resent an interesting setting for analyzing how to
make [financial] markets more accessible in mod-
ern societies.
Despite these boimdary conditions, an extreme
case in complex institutional context such as the
one presented in this paper offers an opportunity to
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study a familiar set of processes and phenomena on
fresh terms and to focus in on key elements that
existing work has neglected (Bamberger & Pratt,
2010). Moreover, too much research on institutions
has been "embarrassingly . . . constructed by U.S.
scholars based on data collected from U.S. organi-
zations" (Scott, 2005: 478). Our case stands apart in
showcasing an "unusual" (albeit, in reality, very
customary and ubiquitous) and a largely unex-
plored setting. This case of market building in rural
Bangladesh is uncommon and anal3^cally extreme in
the literature, but common in the world and hence,
relevant and timely for our research community
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APPENDIX A
Interview and Participant Observation Data
Informant Type of Interviewee (Number of Interviews)
Type of Participant Observation
(Total Number of Observations)
Internals
BRAC management
BRAC university
BRAC programs
Education Program
Social Development
Program
HRLE Program
CFPR/TUP
Economic Development
Health Program
Research and Evaluation
Department
Social enterprises
Aarong (retail)
Dairy & Food Project
BRAC Agriculture &
Livestock Enterprises
Externals
Other NCOs and social
activists
Microfinance institution 1
Microfinance institution 2
NCO in education field 1
NGO in education field 2
Other
Chairman (4), advisory board member (2)
Pro-vice chancellor (1)
Director (1), senior manager (1), manager (2), program
organizer (2), teacher (2), students (2)
Senior manager (3), program officer (2), village organization
leader (1), village organization member (2)
Director (2), manager (1), program officer (1), beneficiary (2)
Director (2), manager (2), jimior manager (1), Beneficiary (2)
Senior manager (2), program officer (2), borrowers (6)
Senior manager (1), program officer (1), volunteer health
worker (1)
Senior researcher (1), junior researcher (1)
Senior manager (1)
Senior manager (1)
Senior manager (1)
General manager (1), program organizer (1), branch manager
(1), borrowers (2)
Chairman (1), program organizer (1)
General managers (1)
Teachers (2)
Local journalist (2), Islamic law specialist (2), missionaries (2),
lawyer and member of Supreme Court of Bangladesh (1),
expatriate manager (2)
Attended courses in primary
school (2)
Attended popular theatre
perfonnance (1)
Attended legal education classes
(1)
Attended microcredit meeting (2)
Attended health meeting (1)
Visited (2)
Visited (1)
Attended microcredit meeting (2)
Visited local branch office (1)
Attended microcredit meeting (1)
Visited garment factories (3)
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APPENDIX B
Statistics for Key Codes from the Programs Studied"
Sproncl-Order
Constructs
Creating spaces for
interaction
Expanding resource
systems
(Re) defining local
arrangements
Developing sensemaking
capacity
(Re)combining norms
and traditions
Code Name F
For equals
For unequals
Tying up witb government
systems
Teaming up witb social
service providers
Building on local means of
issue resolution
Making use of customary
sources of social support
Facilitating
conscientization
Knowledge of repertoires
Demystifying
Adopting artistic
traditional performances
Education
'assage!
20
11
15
19
5
16
44
24
12
14
i Sources
11
6
8
14
3
9
26
17
8
8
Social
Development
Passages
34
12
21
14
15
15
34
19
16
7
Sources
17
8
15
8
10
10
24
12
13
4
HRLE
Passages
31
19
19
26
23
23
25
18
31
21
Sources
18
15
14
18
16
16
19
13
20
14
CFPR
Passages
11
37
12
24
26
26
9
19
14
18
Sources
5
23
7
14
18
18
6
12
7
10
" "Passages" presents the number of passages witb tbe code indicated. "Sources" presents tbe number of sources witb passages baving
tbis code.
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